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English Department

Steven Bruhm
Cell Phones from Hell

Jill

Johnson wasn’t always a naughty girl.
When we first met her in 1979 as the heroine
of When a Stranger Calls (dir. Fred Walton), she
was a responsible teenager with good babysitting references, a quick wit, and enough maternal instinct to guarantee that she be rewarded
with a loving husband and healthy children at
the movie’s end. By 2006, though, things have
changed. In the film’s remake (dir. Simon West),
Jill is a cell phone addict in the midst of a pedestrian romantic crisis. Having broken up with her
boyfriend Bobby, Jill needs to talk to him and to
her girlfriends ad infinitum about how the relationship is over. In so doing she exceeds her cell
phone time allotment by some 800 minutes.
Her father sentences her to one month without
mobile phone or car, and she is forced to babysit to pay down her debts to Pa Johnson and Ma
Bell. By removing the cell phone, her primary
instrument for communicating with her object
of desire, Daddy will teach her a lesson in responsibility and focus—in making “sacrifices . . . even
when it’s hard.” By 2006, the Name of the Father
has gone digital and, with it, America’s Oedipal
landscape has changed, both in crimes and in
punishments. Cellular technology has put Jill in
the middle of the woods to be the prey of a murThe South Atlantic Quarterly 110:3, Summer 2011
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derer, and cellular technology is the means of her torture: the stranger
himself repeatedly calls Jill from a cell phone, evidenced by the fact that
he can talk to her from anywhere inside or outside the house. If the 1970s
telephonic stranger was terrifying because he had invaded the domestic
space to become that ominous shadow at the top of the stairs, the twenty-
first-century murderer is terrifying precisely because he is not fixed. He
is free to roam with his digital phallus firmly clutched in his sweaty palm.
Jill Johnson is not the only young woman to be harassed by cell phones
in the first decade of the new millennium. She is joined by the sorority girls
of Black X-mas,1 also released in 2006 (dir. Glen Morgan), also a remake of
a 1970s telephone terror movie. They, too, receive threatening calls from a
murderer lurking upstairs in the girls’ suburban house—a murderer who,
like Jill Johnson’s stranger, is also no longer fixed to a landline as he was in
the original Black Christmas (dir. Bob Clark, 1974); like the 2006 stranger,
he uses his victims’ cells to beleaguer the survivors until he picks them off
one by one. Then there is the One Missed Call series (dir. Takashi Miike,
2003), which originated in Japan and has replicated itself in an American
remake (dir. Eric Valette, 2008). This group of films depicts the horrors of
cell phone use but with the bonus of eliminating the lethal middleman.
In these films the cell phones do the actual killing. Your phone rings, you
answer, and it plays you the sound of your own death throes, sounds you
will then make for real at the appointed future time of the call. And don’t
think that not owning a cell phone can keep you off the hit list: Stephen
King’s 2006 novel Cell tells the story of America laid waste by a mysterious pulse that has spread through cell phone networks, frying the brains of
those who use them, who then kill those who may not.2 Fusing the fear that
cell phones cause brain cancer with that of “smart mobs” and telephonically
organized terrorism post-9/11, King places cell phones at ground zero of a
contemporary American Armageddon in which mobile users go mad and
ravage the entire nation. Babysitters and sorority girls are prime victims
(because prime users), but they are also synecdoches for a global practice
of networking.
Safety in Numbers
These cell phones from hell, obviously, are the twenty-first century up-to-
date with a vengeance. As communications analysts remind us, “A turning
point in the history of telecommunications was marked in 2002 in that
the number of mobile subscribers overtook the number of fixed-line sub-
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scribers on a global scale: mobiles thus became the dominant technology
for voice communications.”3 According to the New York Times, in 2000 there
were an estimated 77 million cell phones in the United States alone, “with
more than 37,500 people signing up for wireless phone service each day.”4
And most of these users are young adults: “At the end of 2001, 80 percent
of those aged 15 to 24 used [mobile phones] regularly in EU countries,” and
“a third of the Finnish population aged 7 to 10 had their own cellphone.”5
Elsewhere, “the proportion of Japanese girls owning mobile phones under
the age of 18 has reached almost 100%.”6 Part prosthetic device, part fashion statement, the cell phone has come to occupy the paradoxical status of
a cultural fetish that guarantees one’s individuality and prestige. The most
popular girl in school is no longer the prom queen with the largest bosom
and most beautiful pre-engagement ring but the American Idol wannabe
with the biggest address book and the most attractive ringtones.
Given the harassment that Jill Johnson and her cohorts endure, it’s no
small irony that sociologists should agree on the single most important reason for young people to own cell phones and for parents to prescribe them:
safety. In a study conducted in Spain, “no less than 59 percent of new users
were of the opinion that they were safer than when they had access only to a
land-line. This ‘passion for security’ is also reflected in the study . . . carried
out with a US population that had just acquired its first cellphone. When
the phone had not been bought especially for organizing a specific situation
or event, the commonest reason for buying it was precisely safety and security.”7 In this context, safety and security extend beyond the personal and
into the geographical and global. As José García-Montes and his colleagues
put it,
There thus emerges a new frontier that is no longer political, but technological: that of areas without coverage. However far-flung or out-of-the-way a
village may be, it belongs to the “safe world” if it has coverage. With mobile
phone capability we are connected, and, in the worst of cases, we can always
call an emergency service. On the other hand, beyond the limits of coverage
begin isolation and danger. Indeed, for those accustomed to living with the
mobile phone, traveling without it may truly be a risk.8

This cellular mapping presents a logic by which connectivity equals safety
in that cell phones create a phantasm of protection, a visual and audial
sense that the person to whom one is connected can respond effectively
and immediately to any crisis one might be in. This phantasm of connectivity authorizes the 2006 Jill not only to phone the police when the creepy
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calls begin—she does this in 1979 as well—but also to phone her father;
her girlfriend Scarlett; the solicitous mother Mrs. Mandrakis, who has left
her no fewer than two cell phone numbers where she can be reached in case
of emergency; and the Mandrakises’ son, Todd, who may be staying at the
nearby guesthouse. Telephones have got Jill into this mess and phones are
the continued modus operandi of terror, but they are also the connection
to safety and to the parent figures who might come running. Or almost.
Mr. Johnson is not at home, Scarlett is out of range, the police are a good
twenty minutes away, Mrs. M. has turned off her cell, and Todd is off at college. When the chips are down, so are the phones. In the telephone terror
movies of the 1970s, calling for help brought the cops on the run to protect
(albeit poorly) our distressed damsels. In the films of recent years, however,
911 will probably tell you that while your call is important, your service provider is experiencing a heavier than normal volume right now and your call
has been placed in sequence until an operator can attend to you. Eventually you’ll learn that geographical distance or weather conditions make it
impossible for the police to reach you for hours, but don’t worry, you have
your cell and are welcome to phone back with updates to your situation. So
much for safety, cellular or otherwise.
No matter whether the other person answers the phone, cellular
technology is remarkable for the way it proliferates the metaphoric sites
of desire, and particularly the desire of the other, that Avital Ronell suggests
have been contained in the telephone since its invention. As she points out,
the telephone evolved through Alexander Graham Bell’s overdetermined
desire to reconnect to his deaf mother and deaf wife and to revivify his
dead brother;9 in other words, the telephone was the fulfillment of Bell’s
wish to communicate with the otherwise incommunicable, to create across
the lines and through technology the phantasm of himself and the other as
thoroughly connected subjects, and ultimately to heal a fractured familial
network through the healing connections of a prosthetic machine.10 Thus
for Ronell, the telephone’s inaugural line of communication—“Watson,
come here! I want you!”—is a statement of desire:
By all evidence, “I want you” suggests that desire is on the line. . . . It emerges
from what is not present-at-hand; thus, “I want you” phantomizes you. I want
that which I do not possess, I do not have you, I lack you, I miss you: Come
here, Watson, I want you. . . . Where the call as such suggests a commanding
force, the caller, masked by the power apparatus, may in fact be weak, suffering, panicked, putting through a call for help.11
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Whether this is Bell calling the mother, Freud calling the Mother (“Freud
situates the telephone . . . as the perfectibility of the womb [one of ‘man’s’
preferred organs]”),12 or Jill Johnson calling her parents, the telephone creates a phantom of the person who is not there and then bridges the gap
signified by this phantasm. Which makes it not a long distance from “Watson, . . . I want you” to the stranger’s horrific utterance to Jill in both versions of When a Stranger Calls. Asking the Freudian question “What do you
want?” the Jills receive the reply, “I want your blood—all over me.” Like
Bell, the stranger is entirely devoted to human contact; like Bell, he wants
to reach out and touch someone. At least in the 1979 version, the stranger
desires a full communication where he can be understood by others, by all
others, through simple human companionship, sexual conquest, or murder—all physically embodied acts. Cast in telephonic terms, he wants connection in a world that is constantly forcing him to disconnect.
But this reaching out and touching, this wanting connectivity, is very
different in the world of today’s telephone horror movies than it was in
its 1970s analogues. If the new millennium’s telephone movies imagine
proliferated sites of connective desire, new ways of remaining bound to
parents, families, and loved ones across vast distances, these films also
proliferate the sites of terror. Or more to the point of my argument, they
eliminate the idea of “site” altogether. When someone phones you from his
or her landline phone, as was necessarily the case in the 1970s, you imagine
that person in a clearly demarcated space; you “place” him or her at home,
in the office, or wherever you know there to be a phone. This is what rendered 1970s phone films so terrifying: murderers Curt Duncan of When a
Stranger Calls and Billy of Black Christmas were both locatable in a certain
space—the shadow at the top of the stairs, the attic, the housemother’s bedroom. Both hero and villain were imagined as singular, autonomous beings
locatable in space. As long as our heroines were talking on their fixed-line
telephones to murderers on other fixed-line phones, as long as they were
“alone” at their landline talking to someone else alone on his landline, we
knew them to be safe from lethal clutches; we knew that the murderer was
distantly placed at his phone as well. Cell phones make no such promises,
since the murderer can be right behind you, and often is. The cell phone
ups the ante by changing the phantasmatic quality of the interlocutor’s existence or imagined presence. Cell telephony always exploits the ability to
move, not to be placed, not to be fixed: the ability to be a phantasm but at
the same time to be deracinated as phantasm. Moreover, whereas the terrorism of fixed-line telephones rendered the home of the 1970s an unsafe
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place, contemporary cell phone narratives allow the danger to radiate outward, like waves from a cell tower. In the archive of twenty-first-century
telephone terror films, cell phones cut the domestic cord: terror spreads
to cars, guesthouses, parks, hospitals, into other people’s cell phones and
computers, and eventually into other states and countries. Murder has
become viral and self-replicating, claiming as its ultimate victim the speaking—or telephoning—subject.
Is This the Party to Whom I Am Speaking?
For Jean Baudrillard, this deracination of the phantasm of the other—a
deracination produced by technological proliferation—has resulted in what
he calls the “transparency of evil.” He argues that the increased connectivity
offered by digital technology has merely produced the compulsion to produce and to participate in the absolutely uninhibited exchange of particles
between systems and within systems, an exchange that rejects any notion
of otherness or the foreign.13 Thus, the “masses . . . no longer speak, they . . .
chat” (Transparency, 78). Or they text. Or Facebook. Or tweet. The result,
claims Baudrillard, is that we have dissolved the very structure that predicates communication with an “other,” for we have eroded the possibility of
signification itself; there is no longer any distance between a sign and the
thing it might signify or the self and the other to which it might address
itself. As he puts it, “the realm of the screen, of interfaces and duplication,
of contiguity and networks” (54) now “form[s] an integrated circuit with
me. . . . [These digital machines] are so many transparent prostheses, integrated into the body to the point of being almost part of its genetic make-
up” (58). He concludes:
At one time the body was a metaphor for the soul, then [during the sexual
revolution of the 1960s] it became a metaphor for sex. Today it is no longer a
metaphor for anything at all, merely the locus of metastasis, of the machine-
like connections between all its processes, of an endless programming devoid
of any symbolic organization or overarching purpose: the body is thus given
over to the pure promiscuity of its relationship to itself—the same promiscuity that characterizes networks and integrated circuits. (7)

A bracing rejoinder to the sociological theory of safety in cell phones, Baudrillard’s analysis places us in a promiscuous network that is the result of
signs with no referent or meaning beyond themselves, signs that do not
connect, signs not of subjects who communicate but of users who net-
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work. Like those gothic telephoners in our midst, we are deracinated phantasms all.
For those of us wearied by the constant cellular blather around us,
Baudrillard’s jeremiad has a certain appeal. Compare the two versions of
When a Stranger Calls, for example, and one has a real respect for the 1979
Jill (Carol Kane), when she sits stone-faced on the stairs listening to the
telephone ring and refusing—for the only time in the film—to answer it,
because she knows who is on the other end. Contrast this to the up-to-
date Jill (Camilla Belle; is this surname a Hollywood joke?), who continually answers the phone, despite knowing what she’ll hear. And in case we
miss the point, director Simon West interjects a scene in which Jill’s friend
Tiffany wisely suggests that Jill let the phone ring; the Mandrakises’ voice
mail can pick up the message. This suggestion Jill refuses because she’s
expecting a call from Bobby, the very boyfriend to whom she has talked
endlessly in order to “end this thing, once and for all,” the very boyfriend
whose connectivity with Jill has put her in the woods in the first place. Ellis
Hanson suggests, “If you’re in a movie, don’t answer the phone.”14 I would
say that if you’re in a movie, at least a movie about teenagers in the new
millennium, and the phone rings, you have no choice. You have to answer
it; you simply can’t help yourself. The new gothic monster may in the first
instance be the cellular murderer, but the Baudrillardian compulsion to
answer that phone call is the murderer’s chief accomplice.
While Baudrillard nicely frames for us the gothic heroine’s tragic flaw
of going where she should not, his scathing dismissal of digital technology
may be missing some crucial connections of its own, for it too quickly voids
“promiscuous networks” of any meaningful communication. If we are
indeed compelled to participate in “the absolutely uninhibited exchange
of particles” that we watch terrorized teenagers experience in cell phone
movies, then what might be made of that very compulsion to exchange, to
participate? What ends does it serve, and how do those ends figure in a
world of digital communications? I propose that we consider the problems
of telephone connectivity and its gothic terrors through a place where telephones are not: in Georges Bataille’s Erotism: Death and Sensuality. In his
introduction, Bataille boldly claims that eroticism’s “dominant element”
is in the relationship between continuity and discontinuity—what I have
been reading as “connectivity” and “disconnection” in interpersonal relations conducted through the telephone. According to Bataille, “We are discontinuous beings, individuals who perish in isolation in the midst of an
incomprehensible adventure, but we yearn for our lost continuity. We find
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the state of affairs that binds us to our random and ephemeral individuality
hard to bear. Along with our tormenting desire that this evanescent thing
should last, there stands our obsession with a primal continuity linking us
with everything that is.”15 Our primary response to that “obsession with
a primal continuity” is, for Bataille, sexual reproduction: by reproducing
ourselves sexually, we forge a tangible link between ourselves and our offspring (not to mention our sexual partners), and ourselves and the “future.”
Through the child, we live on in a place that we will otherwise not be. Yet,
sexual reproduction also implicitly (or explicitly) announces our discontinuousness, because an other, separate partner is necessary for us to mate,
and the being produced in that mating will be separate from both parents,
a part of them yet totally alienated from them. Thus the inescapable contradiction that Bataille calls “eroticism”: “we yearn for our lost continuity,”
but in that yearning we are confronted with the realization that only violence and death can “wrench” us from our state of discontinuity. Continuity as salvation from physical death can be achieved only through a kind
of ontological death, just as the discontinuity that guarantees our status as
singular beings is that which must be sacrificed in the fantasy of immortality. Like death itself, “Erotic activity, by dissolving the separate beings
that participate in it, reveals their fundamental continuity, like the waves
of a stormy sea” (Erotism, 22). No more a single-cell organism than the girls
who network in telephone terror movies, “What we desire is to bring into
a world founded on discontinuity all the continuity such a world can sustain” (19).
Such a desire to bring continuity to a discontinuous world drives the
narrative of When a Stranger Calls in both its 1979 and 2006 incarnations.
We have already seen Jill’s compulsive attempts at continuity through telephonic connection, attempts that the film parodies by replication in the
murderous speaker’s own desire to connect with her by phone and by blood.
We have also already seen Jill’s attempts at discontinuity, her use of the
phone to broker a release from the repeated attentions of the stranger and
to achieve the kind of isolating safety from him that only a connection to
others can bring. But the 1979 version of the film thematizes this problem
much more fully than mere sensationalism may suggest. After the first—
and most famous—twenty minutes of babysitter terrorizing,16 the film
takes us into the personal life of the murderer, Curt Duncan (Tony Beckley), and his desire to connect with other people. The horror of his desired
connection to Jill through the dead children and through her blood gives
way in the second part of the film to a pathetic, even touching, depiction
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of Curt’s attempt to befriend a woman named Tracy (Colleen Dewhurst).
He approaches her in a bar, has his unwanted advances interrupted by a
chivalrous local who beats him up, and then he follows Tracy home. She
takes pity on him, seeing in him something tender and vulnerable, until
he enters her apartment uninvited. (He intrudes as she leaves the apartment door open to go inside and—you guessed it—answer the ringing telephone.) After repeated rejections and after being hunted by a private detective (Charles Durning) who had worked the case of the Mandrakis child
murders and who is trying to kill Duncan, he ends up in a dumpster tragically chanting, “No one can see me anymore. Nobody can hear me. No one
touches me. I’m not here. I don’t exist. I was never born.” Thus the film
situates this telephonic murderer within the conflicting desires to connect
to the other and to disconnect from all others, to sublimate the self into sex
and the sexual self into death, to be and not to be at the same time. The
paradox is perfectly articulated when, near the film’s end, he returns to
terrorize Jill one last time. Having knocked her husband unconscious and
replaced him in her bed (unbeknownst to her, of course), he utters, “You
can’t see me. But I had to come back. Don’t you know why?” This utterance
warrants our attention. Its first sentence—“You can’t see me”—connects
the lethal Duncan to the one we saw in the film moments earlier, the one
fantasizing his own dissolution; it is a continuation of his drive toward nonbeing, toward his own discontinuity with his unbearable world. Yet the rest
of the speech is a call to continuity with Jill: “I had to come back” to enter
your bed/to kill you, and “Don’t you know why?” invites you into my mental and emotional space to imagine my motives. To engage and to kill, to
be continuous and to assure discontinuity: these are the problems that the
telephone raised in the first twenty minutes of the film and that complete
the film’s lucubrations on telephonic desire and telephonic terror. A discontinuous self needs continuity with the other in order to confirm that self;
yet it also needs to chafe against the draw to connect with the other, as that
connection would violently, even suicidally, confirm its being in the world.
This power—and terror—of Duncan’s role as telephoner/sexual subject turns on his transformation from disembodied telephonic voice to a
body unable to complete any of its attempted calls. For Mladen Dolar, the
second part of the 1979 Stranger renders Duncan “a trivial, broken and desperate creature the moment he ceases to be the threatening presence surmised on the other end of the line, and we see words coming out of his
mouth.”17 In his emphasis on our seeing Duncan speak, Dolar is following
on the work of film theorist Michel Chion and his concept of the “acous-
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matic,” a human voice that emanates from a source we cannot see or an
origin we cannot identify.18 For Chion, the acousmatic destabilizes the listener’s very sense of where she is in space, for the acousmêtre—the phantasmatic producer of the sound—is both inside her head and out (Audio-
Vision, 129). Acousmatic sound raises the question not of what the sound
is or even “where” it is—it’s everywhere—but rather where it comes from
(69). Crucial for Dolar is Chion’s sense that power resides in the penetrating voice, which is homologous to but replaces the panoptic eye: “The power
manifests itself vividly in stories of the harassing phone caller whose ‘voice’
sees everything” (130). Duncan loses that power, Dolar argues, because
“when the voice gets attached to the body, it loses its omnipotent charismatic character—it turns out to be banal, as in The Wizard of Oz. The aura
crumbles, the voice, once located, loses its fascination and power, it has
something like castrating effects on its bearer, who could wield or brandish his or her phonic phallus as long as its attachment to a body remained
hidden.”19 This “de-acousmatizing,” this (re)attachment of voice to body,
performs the same problem that I have presented in terms of the continuous and discontinuous: for Duncan to seek continuity with another is to
vocalize, through the telephone, the demand for intimacy, a demand that
the telephone both enables and forecloses. Likewise for film viewers, who
see in the suturing of Duncan’s (threatening) voice to his (pathetic) body
the continuities of thwarted desire, at the same time they need to disavow
any sympathy with that desire. Fixed within his discontinuous body and in
the midst of his “incomprehensible adventure” (Erotism, 15), Duncan enacts
for us and for himself the irresolvable tension of eroticism.
So what happens when we take Duncan out of the land of fixed,
rotary phones and bring him into the digital age? According to Dolar, the
de-acousmatizing of Duncan, the embodying of this telephoning subject,
produces a banal, castrated, and broken figure worthy of the film critic’s dismissal. While we might question with the cast of the 1979 Stranger whether
Duncan ever really “ceases to be a threatening presence,” it is remarkable
that the 2006 remake of When a Stranger Calls does not humanize the murderer in any way; it does not inscribe in him any sort of narrative that
might make continuous to us his thwarted social and familial relations
and his murderous impulses. He has no name, no context, no psychological condition, no history or subjectivity that would explain, mitigate, or
even adumbrate his pathology.20 And what is even more striking cinematically is that this unnamed stranger is never de-acousmatized. He never
speaks in a way that the camera records. We hear him through the tele-
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phone, we see him violently act, but we never watch him speak. (Nor could
we. While the stranger is played by actor Tommy Flanagan, the stranger’s
voice is provided by Lance Henriksen, an actor we do not otherwise see.) As
a speaking/sexual/violent subject, this stranger may be as caught up as his
predecessor Duncan in negotiating the vagaries of continuity and discontinuity with the other, but this version of the film doesn’t let us know that.
Rather, the stranger presents to us that networked, bottomed-out, deracinated other about which Baudrillard so bitterly complained. The cellular
voice in this film remains as unfixed and deracinated as the cellular user,
unable to be placed or located within the confined space of the body. In
this version of the cellular landscape, it is not simply persons that are displaced—rendered discontinuous—from one another; rather, selves are also
displaced from their own vocalized meaning-productions.
If the 2006 stranger is a killing machine incapable of feeling the
human tension of continuity and discontinuity, that machine is brilliantly
metaphorized in the cellular phone. Remember that the fixed-line phone,
as we saw in 1979, mediated its subjects in ways so that connection and
disconnection meant something specific: connection with the murderer
meant safety from his clutches (that is, it assured discontinuity), and a
disconnected phone or prolonged busy signal would indicate to a caller
that something is wrong on the other end. (Jill’s dead phone near the 1979
film’s end brings the private eye to her house, where he then shoots and
kills Duncan.) But in 2006, phones do not (dis)connect to subjects because
there are no “subjects”—conventionally imagined—to (dis)connect. The
stranger is not, like Duncan, seeking connection to others in a way that
blood and phones might provide. At the beginning of the film, he calls
Alice, but when Stacy answers the phone instead, she is substituted for
the stranger’s intended victim. Later in the film the stranger may indeed
want Jill’s blood all over him, as he did in 1979, but the Simon West version
writes out all the other strategies Duncan used for making interpersonal
connection. The later stranger does not murder the sleeping children or
bathe himself in their blood, even though he has the chance. The two victims we do get to see—the housemaid Maria and Jill’s friend Tiffany—are
left physically intact on their deaths. Indeed, any human connection that
either woman may have provided for Jill during her trials is displaced onto
their cell phones: we get a long scene in which Jill repeatedly dials Maria’s
cell in order to locate her, but all Jill can eventually turn up is Maria’s abandoned phone. This situation repeats itself with Tiffany but ups the ante.
Jill eventually finds Tiffany’s dead but otherwise intact body lying next to
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Figure 1. A dead Tiffany by her cell phone. Film
still, When a Stranger Calls, dir. Simon West,
2006

its mobile (see figure 1) but not before Jill has received a call from the
stranger on Tiffany’s cell. The stranger has murdered Tiffany for her phone,
and the “caller ID” function that would name the subject on the other end
of the (nonexistent) line is now nothing but a postmodern joke. Nothing
but death is on the other end, an absence that deracinates all subjects and
dissolves them into a network of continually discontinuous persecutions.
Whereas mobile phones have moved us from a position of asking
“Who are you?” to “Where are you?” When a Stranger Calls moves us from
wondering “Who is there?” and “Where is he?” to “Where is there? ” Eventually, we find that no one is “there” because there is no there there; he is
no one and nowhere in particular. The Black Christmas series will do much
the same thing, only with a change in tone. In this narrative, a murderous
character named Billy inhabits the attic of a university sorority house that
used to be his childhood home and where, at least in the 2006 version,
he murdered or maimed other members of his family at Christmas. As
the sorority girls prepare for the holidays with varying degrees of Yuletide
spirit (all relating to the kind of connections they have with their families),
the murderer kills them one by one. The remaining residents then receive
calls on the house phone downstairs, calls that barrage them with voices
both menacing and vulnerable—voices that channel Billy’s parents and his
childhood self as well as voices that threaten the young women with various
forms of violation. In the 1974 original, the police trace the calls to find they
are coming from the housemother’s phone upstairs; in the 2006 remake,
calls are eventually traced through *69, the automatic call-back function
(the same one Jill used to find what was left of Tiffany). And whereas the
1974 Black Christmas assures us that there is only one caller—all the other
voices are being condensed and ventriloquized by Billy—the 2006 version
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Figure 2. The sorority house phone. Film still,
Black Christmas, dir. Bob Clark, 1974

introduces a sister, Agnes, who had been cryptically named in the original
movie but who now joins in on the terrorizing. Whereas the singular caller
and receiver of When a Stranger Calls have led us to see how the self frays in
a network of connectivity, Black Christmas places us already in a network of
multiple callers, multiple receivers, multiple desirers, multiple killers. Cell
telephony in Stranger may have suggested that there was no “there” where
a self could inhabit the space-time of subjectivity, but Black Christmas leads
us to conclude that there are too many theres to lend the concept of “there”
any interpretive sense.
The interpersonal and familial networks of the 1974 Black Christmas
make the telephone the perfect metaphor for the subject’s will to continuity in a discontinuous world. Distinct voices and discontinuous subjectivities from Billy’s past are gathered together in his head and larynx from
which they are transmitted across a single phone line to the receiver of the
downstairs telephone, around which the (distinct, discontinuous) sorority
sisters gather to listen (see figure 2). The telephone’s formal connectivity
of discontinuous subjects is paralleled in the content of the voices on the
phone, which range from expressions of desire to have sex with and/or kill
the sorority sisters to a wailing for family unity. “What your mother and I
must know,” intones a voice that must be the father’s, “is, where did you
put the baby, Billy? Where did you put Agnes?” Director Bob Clark offers
no Psycho-like explanation for Billy’s condition (we would not get that until
2006), but it is clear that Billy is driven—and riven—by the desire to bring
his childhood self, his sister, and his parents together into some sort of
whole. As Bataille would have it, though, that continuous whole is as terri-
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fying as its alternative: at one point midway through the film, the hysterically polyphonic voices give way to a sonically clear and univocal plea, “Help
me. Please stop. Oh God, please. Help me.” Like Duncan, Billy agonizes
over the desire to connect and the desire to be discontinuous: to paraphrase
Duncan, he doesn’t exist, but he still has to come back.
Billy’s uncanny practice of drawing together multiple, discontinuous
voices and monologizing them through the telephone is heightened by the
fact that in 1974 the murderer remains acousmatized. We never see him
speak and can only trust the other characters’ perception that he “does” all
the voices.21 In 2006, we do get a de-acousmatizing, but with a difference:
we see Agnes repeatedly speak, and we see Agnes repeatedly murder, but
what we don’t see, curiously, is either Billy or Agnes talking on the phone.
We hear Billy’s voice only once in the film (or once that we can be sure of ),
in the flashback to that fateful, remarkable unmerry Christmas in which he
avenges himself on his dreadful mother. Billy phones her to echo back to
her what she said to him about baby Agnes: “She’s my family now.” Knowing something is terribly wrong, the mother races through the house until
she finds Billy attacking Agnes and eating one of her eyeballs. Moments
later, he kills both mother and stepfather, turns his mother’s flesh into
Christmas cookies, and bakes and eats her. Fifteen years later he returns
from prison, mysteriously joined by Agnes, who has also been institutionalized all this time, and the phone calls and murders begin again. However, while many of the murders are clearly performed by Agnes, the phone
caller remains unidentifiable. It may be Billy or Agnes, both or neither. And
the content of the calls does little to help. Amid the vocal rattling and threatening, screaming and ventriloquizing, the phone calls repeatedly intone
that someone is “my family now.” “My family”—that which is connected to
and phantasmatically continuous with me, Ma Bell, Bell’s Watson—is spoken in the film not only by child Billy to nasty mommy, but nasty mommy
to baby Agnes, sorority sister to sorority sister, boyfriends to girlfriends,
girlfriends to other sisters’ family members, housemothers to students,
and on and on throughout the film. If there is a de-acousmatizing going
on in this movie, it takes place across a totally promiscuous network of
villains and victims alike. Pace Mladen Dolar, attaching a voice to a body
has nothing to do with weakening and castration; rather, it is the uncanny
effect of an obsessive drive to continuity that networks and demolishes at
the same time.
Cinematically, then, the Black Christmas series replaces Chion’s
“voice that sees” with an “eye that hears.” In the 1974 version of the movie,
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Figure 3. Agnes eats an eyeball. Film still, Black
X-mas, dir. Glen Morgan, 2006

Figure 4. Flying eyeball screen saver. Film still,
Black X-mas, dir. Glen Morgan, 2006

a character named Peter tries to stop his girlfriend Jess (the film’s heroine,
played by Olivia Hussey) from aborting their child: he chides her that she
speaks of an abortion as if it were “like having a wart removed.” Jess then
hears the phrase again, lobbed at her over the phone during one of the murderer’s calls, which emphasizes the sonic nature of gothic terrorism.22 If
the Jill Johnsons of When a Stranger Calls were plagued by the idea that the
stranger could see them—even though, in the fixed-line telephone version
we know better—the college students of Black Christmas believe that they
can be heard. They sure can, but not in the way that early telephone terror
films would make the party line or the telephone extension the medium by
which one could eavesdrop (think Barbara Stanwyck in Sorry, Wrong Number): the 2006 Black X-mas is littered with shots of eyeballs looking out of
posters, through holes in walls, up from displaced floor tiles, into and out
of prison-door peepholes, even within screen savers (see figures 3 and 4).
Seeing and hearing fuse as sorority sisters are murdered equally for their
cell phones and their eyeballs, the former to phone the survivors, the latter
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to provide Agnes with a snack before she festoons her Christmas tree with
eyeless heads (accompanied by observations such as “He’s my family now”
and “Everyone should be home for Christmas”). The point here, I think, is
to replace the traditional, foreboding sense of surveillance by the panoptic
eye with the new sense that, in our cellular culture, we are always under
a kind of sonic surveillance, that our speech, our sound, and our acts of
sounding are now the object of the gaze.23 Although cell phones cannot be
on party lines, overheard through extensions, or easily traced to a precise
locale, our ability to generate telephonic speech everywhere and anywhere
to someone anywhere and everywhere has brought the all-seeing eye to the
ear. Our telephonic continuities are the perfect uninterrupted spectacle.
As Guy Rosolato has argued, the subject lives within a “sonorous envelope”
because the ear cannot streamline the stimulation it receives.24 The eye sees
hemispherically, but the ear perceives what is behind it as well. At the same
time, though, the ear cannot match the eye for the distance across which it
can perceive and understand sensory data. The cell phonic eye-that-hears
does both.
Babysitter, Don’t You See I’m Burning?
Let’s return one last time to the cultural statistics on cell phone use. In
spite of Baudrillard’s claim that digital networks are “devoid of any symbolic organization or overarching purpose” (Transparency, 76), the cell
phone as a thing has an enormous symbolic function. José García-Montes,
Domingo Caballero-Muñoz, and Marino Pérez-Álvarez argue that the feeling of safety guaranteed by cellular connectivity does not actually depend
on there being someone else to talk to. Rather, given that the idea of cell
phone security is more prevalent among women than among men, “it has
been found that approximately 60 percent of women display their mobile
phone when alone in the public (a much higher proportion than the 47 percent of men in the same situation). This statistic reflects the experience of
many women, who claim that the cellphone is an instrument for deterring
undesired attention.”25 In the United States, this display of digital weaponry goes one step further to create a phantasmatic other to whom one is
connected: technology analyst James E. Katz has found that one in four
people surveyed have “pretended to talk on the mobile phone when there
was actually no one on the other end of the line.”26 What I find interesting
here is not simply that the cell phone signals to others that one is armed
and ready for battle, nor am I most taken with the opposite implication, that

Bruhm

•

Cell Phones from Hell

617

the mobile encourages a receding from public space—what Erving Goffman
calls “civil inattention”27—that is as likely to make a caller walk out in front
of a bus as it is to protect her from stalkers. Rather, I find fascinating the
ways in which cell phone users manufacture a ghostly, dematerialized presence as an interlocutor. One becomes a ghost talking to a ghost or a schizophrenic wired to the wireless. Judging from these studies, cell telephony
has not signaled the end of metaphor, as Baudrillard suggested in my discussion above, but has created new metaphors for the networking subject:
while we may no longer be fixed in space to communicate, across distance,
with an other, we now inhabit an amorphous plane somewhere between
connectedness to the world at large and social insularity, and between the
embodiedness of speaking subjects and their discorporeality. Our being-
in-the-world has become something of a not-being-while-on-the-phone, as
the desire we have for another radiates outward to form nothing more than
a desirous relation toward our selves, a relation both confirmed and cut off
by our own sonorous envelopes.
Telephone terror movies have understood this “call as death sentence”
since their popularity in the 1970s.28 When Jill Johnson repeatedly receives
the ominous call to check the children, when she is continually being summoned to the place of their death and dismemberment, she—and we—join
in the fantasy of that famous mourning father in Freud, the father whose
dead dream-child visits him to ask, “Father, don’t you see I’m burning?”29
The children, already dead, call out to be recognized in their deaths, just as
the now-dead Lenz family call out through Billy’s telephonic ventriloquism
so that they, too, speak from beyond the grave. And it is a fantasy in which
we are all eager to participate: we flock to cell phone terror movie remakes
of the new millennium to check the children once more to ensure that they
aren’t burning (or to ensure that they are); we repeatedly, obsessively place
and answer digital calls even though (or because) all evidence suggests that
the call will end in disconnection, loss of service, unavailable parties, dead
agents; we bury our loved ones with their cell phones should they need or
want to call us from beyond the grave.30 When a stranger calls on his cell
phone (or yours), it may then be to metaphorize telephony itself in the
contemporary age, to mirror acoustically the rhizomic deracinations of the
phantasmatic subject in a world of digital desire. When a stranger calls on
his cell phone (or yours), it may be to present through the voice that sees or
the eye that hears what we do when we repeatedly, obsessively turn to the
phone. When a stranger calls, it may be to take us beyond the pleasure principle to the discommunicating space where the Freudian child throws out
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the line and reels it back in to find what he wants on the other end, which
is the end itself—the end of the line, the end of communication, the end of
any desire that might be satisfied.
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